

## Message Text

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O 110211Z NOV 75  
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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 266238

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y-PRECEDENCE TO ALL NATO CAPS CORRECTED

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI, MPOL, NATO, PFOR

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SUBJECT:NATO STANDARDITION

REFS: A. USNATO 5772 DTG 231511Z OCT 75; B. STATE 176498  
DTG 252330Z JUL 75; C. STATE 250695 DTG 220011Z OCT 15;

D. USNATO 6015 DTG 051800Z NOV 75; E. USNATO 6040  
DTG 061621Z NOV 75; F. USNATO 6091 DTG 071940Z NOV 75;  
G. STATE 248678 DTG 201655Z OCT 75. (ALL NOTAL)

HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. WE FOUND REF A REPORTING OF OCTOBER 22 NAC DISCUSSIONS OF STANDARDIZATION VERY USEFUL. ALSO APPRECIATE MISSION'S REMARKS CONTAINED REF D. AND FINALLY WE HAVE REVIEWED THE INITIAL REPORTING OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE NOV 5 EUROGROUP MEETING (REF F). MISSION MAY DRAW ON PARAS 2-7 BELOW IN THE COURSE OF NOVEMBER 12 DISCUSSIONS. ADDITIONALLY, CAPITALS AND MILITARY HEADQUARTERS MAY USE THIS INFORMATION DURING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES.

2. WHILE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NOVEMBER 5 EUROGROUP ARE UNDER CAREFUL SCRUTINY, WE HAVE NOT DEVELOPED CONSIDERED REACTIONS. PENDING FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND INFORMATPON, INCLUDING EUROGROUP BRIEFING TO NAC, AND ALLIED AND

ESPECIALLY FRENCH REACTIONS TO EUROGROUP THINKING, WE BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH ANY POTENTIAL CONCERNS THAT MAY BE POSED BY EUROGROUP DEVELOPMENTS IS TO CONTINUE OQR EMPHASIS IN NATO ON MOVING AHEAD WITH THE FORMATION OF A BROADLY MANDATED AD HOC COMMITTEE ON STANDARDIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS OVERALL TERMS OF REFERENCE.

3. IF QUESTIONS ARISE (REF D) CONCERNING CONTINUED US INTEREST IN AND POLICY ON STANDARDIZATION, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO ALLIES THAT THE IMPETUS BEHIND THE CURRENT US INITIATIVE IS BEST SUMMARIZED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT THE NATO SUMMIT LAST MAY.

4. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS AT NAC PERM REP LEVEL SHOULD HELP THE AD HOC COMMITTEE BEGIN WITH BETTER POLITICAL DIRECTION AND SUPPORT, BUT YOU SHOULD AGAIN EXPRESS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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US VIEW THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE SHOULD BE FORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS IN DETAIL THE UNDERLYING ISSUES WHICH, WE BELIEVE, WILL BE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF MEANINGFUL PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTING PLAN OF ACTION FOR MINISTERS' ENDORSEMENT AT SPRING 76 MEETINGS. MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO DRAW ON REF B IN NAC DISCUSSIONS AND CONTINUE TO URGE ALLIES TO REACH CONSENSUS ON (1) BROAD GOALS OF STANDARDIZATION, (2) THE LIMITING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FACTORS, AND (3) MAJOR PROBLEMS NONCERNING METHODS AND PROCEDURES WHICH THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL HAVE TO SOLVE.

5. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF NAC DISCUSSIONS, AND THROUGH

CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLIES, WE FULLY APPRECIATE THAT THE CRITICAL ISSUES ARE AS MISSION HAS DEFINED THEM IN PARA 21 OF REF A. THESE CRITICAL ISSUES ARE BASIC AND SWEEPING AND FOR THAT REASON ARE UNANSWERABLE IN ANY DEFINITIVE FASHION AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE CAN STATE OUR BROAD INTENTIONS BY CITING WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID LAST MAY, AND WHAT VARIOUS US SPOKESMEN HAVE SAID SUBSEQUENTLY. HOWEVER, DETAILED ANSWERS WILL ONLY BE FOUND IN THE GIVE AND TAKE OF DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION AS EFFORTS IN FACT PROCEED TO RATIONALIZE AND STANDARDIZE NATO'S DEFENSE EFFORT. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE HAVE VIEWS ON ELEMENTS OF THESE CRITICAL ISSUES, THEY ARE CONTAINED IN THE MATERIAL WHICH FOLLOWS AND SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE DRAWN UPON FULLY IN DISCUSSIONS. MISSION SHOULD FURTHER INDICATE TO THE ALLIES THAT WE EXPECT TO DEVELOP US VIEWS MORE FULLY DURING COURSE OF EXCHANGES IN THE NAC AND IN THE AD HOC GROUP. WE APPRECIATE THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FULLY DEVELOPED POSITION ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF STANDARDIZATION. OUR ANSWERS TO THE

CRITICAL ISSUES POSED BY MISSION WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

-- ITEM A. A SYSTEM THAT CALLS FOR COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOLLOWED BY PRODUCTION OF A COMMON SYSTEM WITH NOMINAL LICENSE FEES SHOULD PERMIT THE EUROPEANS TO CONTINUE PRESENT LEVELS OF BOTH R AND D AND PRODUCTION. IN FACT, SUCH A SYSTEM SHOULD ASSIST EUROPE IN REFOCUSING AND CONCENTRATING DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES IN SUCH A CONFIDENTIAL

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WAY THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF SYSTEMS ADOPTED BY THE US WILL BE OF EUROPEAN DESIGN.

-- ITEM B. THE US IS NOT PREPARED TO FOREGO COST-EFFECTIVENESS AS A BASIC CRITERION IN PURCHASING ARMAMENTS. THIS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR BY USG SPOKESMEN IN THE MANY DISCUSSIONS THEY HAVE HAD WITH EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS. THE US WILL ADOPT FOREIGN ARMAMENTS WHEN THEY FULFILL A US NEED, PROMOTE STANDARDIZATION, AND ARE COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS. A SYSTEM EMPHASIZING COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND LICENSED PRODUCTION OF A COMMON SYSTEM WILL MEAN THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL BE MOTIVATED TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFICIENCY. TO THE EXTENT EUROPEAN PRODUCTION FACILITIES ARE NOT COST-EFFECTIVE, EUROPE WILL HAVE TO PAY HIGHER PRICES FOR THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS. BUT STANDARDIZATION SHOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF PRODUCTION IN EUROPE AND LONGER PRODUCTION RUNS IN MANY CASES. IN SHORT, US EFFICIENCY SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED, AND EUROPEAN EFFICIENCY SHOULD GRADUALLY IMPROVE.

-- ITEM C. WHILE LICENSING IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF THE

BEST INITIAL MEANS FOR ACHIEVING STANDARDIZATION, WE HOPE TO MAKE MORE US PURCHASES OF SYSTEMS AND SUB-SYSTEMS FROM EUROPE. IN ADDITION, INCREASED EUROPEAN LICENSING OF US SYSTEMS RATHER THAN DIRECT PURCHASE SHOULD HELP TO REDRESS THE BALANCE ON THE QTE TWO-WAY STREET UNQTE. NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD EXPECT THE BALANCE TO CONTINUE TO FAVOR THE US TO SOME DEGREE IN RECOGNITION OF THE US R AND D INVESTMENT, THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE US DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND PRODUCTION BASE, AND TO EQUALIZE THE FINANCIAL BURDEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATIONING OF US TROOPS IN EUROPE.

-- ITEM D. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER HAS TO BE JUDGED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE F-16 CONTRACT PROVIDES FOR COMPLETE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE LIFE OF THE CONTRACT. PRODUCTION UNDERLICENSE TENDS TO TRANSFER ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGY RATHER QUICKLY. AS EUROPEAN R AND D BECOMES BETTER FOCUSED IT WILL BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE, WITH TECHNOLOGY BEING TRANSFERRED BACK TO THE US AS WELL. CONFIDENTIAL

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6. THE FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATION OF US VIEWS MAY ALSO BE USEFUL IN NAC DISCUSSIONS WS WELL AS IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES.

-- BASIC GOALS. OUR PRIMARY GOAL SHOULD BE TO INCREASE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. AGREED OR CLOSELY COMPATIBLE MILITARY DOCTRINE AND COMMON OR AT LEAST INTEROPERABLE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPON SYSTEMS WILL PERMIT:

(A) IMPROVED COOPERATION BETWEEN ADJACENT ALLIED UNITS IN COMBAT.

(B) INCREASED FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE MAJOR UNITS INTO AREAS MANNED BY OTHER ALLIES DRAWING ON EXISTING STOCKS AND LINES OF SUPPLY.

(C) INCREASED MODERNIZATION OF FORCES WITH RESOURCES SAVED BY ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION IN WEAPON SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT.

-- LIMITPNG FACTORS AFFECTING STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS.

(A) SINCE THE ALLIANCE IS COMPOSED OF 15 SOVEREIGN NATIONS, SINGLE SOURCE PRODUCTION OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT IS OFTEN VIEWED AS HAVING THE POTENTIAL FOR UNACCEPTABLE DEPENDENCE.

(B) MANY ALLIANCE MEMBERS HAVE WEAPONS DESIGN TEAMS AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE TO DISCONTINUE IN THE SHORT RUN AND, IN MANY CASES, EVEN IN THE LONG RUN.

(C) SINGLE-SOURCE PRODUCTION COULD LEAVE THE ALLIANCE MORE VULNERABLE TO LOCAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC FACTORS AS WELL AS SABOTAGE AND MILITARY ACTION.

(D) INTRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS TAKES PLACE GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS, THEREFORE, THE DEGREE OF STANDARDIZATION WILL VARY IN NATIONS AND THROUGHOUT THE TOTAL NATO FORCE. THIS REQUIRES OUR CONSTANT  
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ATTENTION.

-- DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS FOR WEAPON SYSTEMS. THERE IS AN INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOCTRINE AND WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD WEAPON SYSTEM STANDARDIZATION, ALL MEMBERS OF NATO NEED TO BE COGNIZANT OF THIS RELATIONSHIP AND TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN DEFENSE PLANNING. THERE WILL HAVE TO BE GREATER HARMONY IN THE WAY NATIONS APPROACH DEFENSE TASKS. ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL

CASES SHOULD GEOGRAPHY OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS BE PERMITTED TO PREVENT STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES MUST CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING GREATER COMPATIBILITY OF DOCTRINE AND PROVIDING APPROPRIATE GUIDELINES FOR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS.

-- COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. COMPETITIVE PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT OF WHOLE SYSTEMS OR OF SUB-SYSTEMS OFTEN WILL RESULT IN THE BEST WEAPONS CAPABILITY FOR A GIVEN AMOUNT OF RESOURCES EXPENDED. COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT WILL ENCOURAGE INNOVATION, PROVIDE OPTIONS AND USUALLY REDUCE THE COST OF THE SYSTEM CHOSEN FOR PRODUCTION. COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT WILL ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF MORE THAN ONE DESIGN TEAM IN EACH TECHNOLOGICAL AREA -- DESIRABLE FROM SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POINTS OF VIEW. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENTS MUST BE REDUCED BELOW PRESENT LEVELS IN MANY SYSTEMS AREAS. THE ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD TO FINANCE FOUR OR FIVE COMPETITIVE PROTOTYPES FOR A SINGLE SYSTEM. INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WILL HAVE TO FURTHER CONCENTRATE THEIR DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE WEAPONS AREAS WHERE THEY ARE MOST EFFECTIVE AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE MULTINATIONAL (INTRA-EUROPEAN AS WELL AS EUROPEAN/NORTH AMERICAN) INDUSTRIAL TEAMING ARRANGEMENTS TO MAKE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES AND TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF SELECTING THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS. THE MEASURE OF COST EFFECTIVENESS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO INITIAL PROCUREMENT. IN SOME CASES IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO PAY A PREMIUM IN THE INITIAL PRICE OF A STANDARD ITEM IF SUCH STANDARDIZ-

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ATION LEADS TO A COMMENSURATE RECOUPMENT IN OPERATING COST OVER TIME, OR TO A DESIRED IMPROVEMENT IN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. IN THE LIGHT OF WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES THE TOTAL ALLIANCE R AND D EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED, BUT SHOULD BE FOCUSED MORE EFFECTIVELY.

-- SELECTION OF COMMON SYSTEMS AND MULTIPLE PRODUCTION SOURCES. AT THE END OF A COMPETITION THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM SHOULD NORMALLY BE SELECTED, AND APPROPRIATE SUPERIOR CHARACTERISTICS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE DESIGN FROM THE PROTOTYPES NOT SELECTED. IN ORDER TO MAKE SELECTION OF A COMMON SYSTEM MORE ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE, DOUBLE CHARGE FOR DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. AN ALLY THAT CARRIES OUT A COMPARABLE COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PRODUCE OR CO-PRODUCE THE SELECTED SYSTEM WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS COSTS IN THE FORM OF A R AND D RECOUPMENT SURCHARGE. IN FACT, WHEN LARGE

NUMBERS OF A WEAPON SYSTEM ARE NEEDED IN THE ALLIANCE, IT ALSO MAY BE DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE PRODUCTION OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALLIES WHO DO NOT COMPETE. AND ALLIANCE MEMBERS WITH LIMITED WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY SHOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE SUB-SYSTEMS WHEN THEY CAN DO SO ON A COST EFFECTIVE BASIS. IN THE CASE OF MOST MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS, IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE PRODUCTION BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN NORTH AMERICA. ONCE ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS ARE AGREED WHICH MAKE A COMMON SELECTION FEASIBLE, MILITARY USERS SHOULD BE GIVEN AN IMPORTANT VOICE IN THE DECISION AS TO WHICH PROTOTYPE SHOULD BE PRODUCED. IN THOSE CASES WHERE COMMON AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED OR WHERE MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM OF A GIVEN TYPE GREATLY COMPOUNDS THE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE PROBLEM, THE INTEROPERABILITY/ INTERCHANGEABILITY (IF NOT STANDARDIZATION) OF THE WINNING SYSTEMS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

-- THIRD COUNTRY SALES. ONE SOURCE OF DESTANDARDIZATION IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR VARIOUS ALLIES TO SUPPLY WEAPON SYSTEMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES, TO SATISFY POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITMENTS OR ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES. ALLIES  
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OFTEN DEVELOP DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF A WEAPON PARTLY FOR THE SAKE OF SUCH SALES. AS A RESULT, SELECTION OF A COMMON WEAPON SYSTEM MUST ALLOW FULFILLMENT OF THESE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC NEEDS AND OBJECTIVES THROUGH EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SALES

UNDER LICENSE OR THROUGH OTHER METHODS IF A NATION

FOREGOES PRODUCTION. CERTAIN TECHNOLOGY MUST BE RETAINED  
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OR LIMITED TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES  
FOR SECURITY REASONS.

-- HARDWARE PROJECTS VS. STANDARDIZATION PRINCIPLES. IN  
RESPONSE TO MISSION CONCERN OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A,  
REGARDING ALLIES APPARENT DESIRE TO SEEK SHORT-TERM  
ECONOMIC GAINS THROUGH EARLY HARDWARE SALES AND THE  
POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR LONGER TERM STANDARDIZA-  
TION EFFORTS, WE DO NOT SEE ANY MAJOR CONFLICT SO LONG AS  
THE BROAD PRINCIPLES AND GOALS ARE KEPT WELL IN SIGHT.  
IT SEEMS TO US THAT THOSE SPECIFIC STANDARDIZATION  
ACTIVITIES THAT ARE NOW ONGOING, SUCH AS F-16, ROLAND,  
AWACS, FRG-US TANK COMPETITION, AND THE PREPARATION OF  
EUROGROUP LISTS, SHOULD BE CONTINUED; PROGRESS THAT IS  
MADE SHOULD SERVE TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDING  
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES. WE WILL PROVIDE REPORTS ON  
THESE AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS FOR YOUR USE IN DISCUSSIONS  
(FOR ONE SUCH REPORT ON AWACS, SEE REF G). AT THE SAME  
TIME WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE EARLY PREPARATION OF

OVERALL POLICY GUIDANCE THROUGH THE WORK NOW UNDERWAY IN  
THE NAC. THE LATTER WORK SHOULD COMPLEMENT AND  
FACILITATE HARDWARE INITIATIVES UNDERWAY IN THE CNAD AND  
IN OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CHANNELS.

7. FINALLY, WE APPRECIATE THAT DRAFT OF STANDARDIZATION  
PRINCIPLES CAN NOT BE COMPLETED FOR USE AT THE DECEMBER  
MINISTERIALS, BUT BELIEVE THAT CONTINUING EXCHANGES OF  
VIEWS IN THE NAC AS WELL AS IN OTHER MORE INFORMAL  
CONTACTS CAN RESULT IN A BROAD CONSENSUS CONCERNING  
PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED IN MORE DETAIL BY THE  
AD HOC COMMITTEE WHEN ESTABLISHED.

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## Message Attributes

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